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ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER CANNOT BE UPHELD ON ALTERNATIVE GROUNDS. 
The trial court's reliance on 30-3-37 was an abuse of discretion and the order 
modifying decree cannot be upheld on those grounds. "The trial court's broad 
discretion in making child custody [ and parent time] awards is limited in that it 
must be exercised within confines of legal standard set by appellate courts." 
Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). The trial court in this 
case disregarded the statutory direction and legal precedent and imposed a parent-
time order that is an abuse of discretion. 
The trial court abused its discretion in modifying the decree. The trial court 
failed to take into consideration the impact awarding additional parent time in 
excess of section 30-3-37 would have on the parties' children. The impact of one 
parent's relocation, necessitating extensive travel for the exercise of parent time, is 
among those factors considered by the legislature prior to enacting the relocation 
statute, section 30-3-37. Section 37 strikes a balance between the needs of children 
to have a close and meaningful relationship with both parents and the inherent 
dangers, expenses and burdens created by long distance parenting arrangements. 
That the legislature chose 150 miles as the limit for allowing parent time under 30-
3-35 is telling. Beyond 150 miles, the danger, expense and burden of parent time, 
as well as the inevitable disruption of the children's lives, becomes increasingly 
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unreasonable and not in the children's best interest. It is apparent that the 
legislature considered that within 150 miles, children would be able to maintain 
some semblance of consistency and participation in their home lives. The burden 
of the travel within that distance is presumptively outweighed by the benefit of the 
increased contact with the non-custodial parent. Beyond 150 miles, the danger of 
travel, the expense of travel, and the interference with the lives of the children 
outweigh the benefit of parent time under 30-3-35 with the non-custodial parent. 
The burden of travel imposed on Appellant in this case is unreasonable. The 
trial court was well aware of the distance between Monroe, Utah, the children's 
home, and Moab, Utah, Appellee's place of residence. In addition to the distance, 
the highway itself is steep, winding, and treacherous. Deer are often hit by cars on 
parts of the route. Snow is common from fall to spring. Requiring the parties to 
drive that route two or three times each month is unreasonable. It is not in the 
children's best interests. 
Section 30-3-37 also places the burden of monthly parent time on the non-
custodial parent. The trial court disregarded the statute and fashioned an allocation 
of the travel expenses that places a slightly higher burden on Appellee, but requires 
Appellant to pay travel expenses beyond those contemplated in section 30-3-37. 
Neither party is in a financial position to pay the additional expense of long 
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distance parent time. It is an abuse of the trial court's discretion to impose that 
burden on Appellant. 
Appellant is not suggesting that the children's peer interactions and activities 
are more important than their relationship with their mother. To the contrary, the 
children need to have a close and meaningful relationship with both of their 
parents. However, when parents divorce, the relationships between children and 
parents are inevitably impacted. When divorcing parents live in close geographic 
proximity, Utah law dictates that the best interests of the children are served by 
having, at a minimum, contact with the non-custodial parent on the schedule found 
in section 30-3-35. When divorcing parent live further apart, the legislature has 
determined that the best interests of the children are best served by reducing the 
number of visits with the non-custodial parent, but increasing the duration of those 
~ visits. In addition to the risk of travel and the cost as mentioned above, the impact 
on the children of being removed from their home and community environment 
I@ also comes into play. Under the current order, the children are completely 
removed from their home and community every other weekend. Because of this 
removal, the children lose many of the vital and formative experiences of 
~ 
childhood, including participation in sports, boy scout groups, and so forth. This is 
not to say that such participation is, in itself, more important than spending time 
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with Appellee. It is one factor of many the legislature considered in enacting 
section 30-3-37. 
THERE WAS No MATERIAL CHANGE OF CmcUMSTANCES SUFFICIENT TO 
SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER. 
Appellee apparently argues that because of the fact that the children would 
get older was not specifically mentioned in the original decree of divorce, that it 
was not contemplated at the time the decree was entered, and that a change in their 
ages was therefore a change not anticipated at the time of trial. This argument 
lacks merit. Everyone involved in the original trial was well aware that children 
grow as they age. There was no evidence presented at trial that any of the children 
had issues that would stunt their growth or limit their development. The trial court 
plainly took into consideration the children growing up in fashioning its order as 
all trial courts, often subconsciously, do in making custody orders. The trial 
court's reliance on the children growing up as a previously unanticipated change of 
circumstances is in error. 
Appellee devotes much of her brief to her argument that a finding of a 
material change of circumstances is unnecessary and that the court's order 
modifying the decree should be upheld on alternative grounds. Her admission is 
that there was no material change of circumstances supports Appellant's arguments 
as outlined in the his original brief. 
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THE APPEAL IS NOT FRlvOLOUS. 
Appellant's appeal is well-founded on statute and case law. There is nothing 
frivolous in the appeal that would support an award of fees to Appellee. Rule 33 of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides: 
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a :friv:olous appeal, 
motion, brief, or other paper is one that is not grounded in fact, not 
warranted by existing law, or not based on a good faith argwnent to 
extend, modify, or reverse existing law. An appeal, motion, brief, or 
other paper interposed for the purpose of delay is one interposed for 
any improper purpose such as to harass, cause needless increase in the 
cost of litigation, or gain time that will benefit only the party filing the 
appeal, motion, brief, or other paper. 
As outlined in his original brief, and in this reply brief, the trial court has 
abused its discretion in modifying the decree. Appellant's argwnents are made in 
the plain reading and application of Utah law, particularly section 30-3-37, and the 
cases interpreting the parent time statues. The appeal is not motivated by a desire 
to limit Appellee's contact with the children. The appeal is not motivated by a 
desire to increase Appellee's legal expenses. The purpose of the appeal is to put 
the children in the situation that meets their best interests under the difficult 
circumstances created by the parties' divorce. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated in this brief and the original brief of Appellant, this 
court should reverse the order of the trial court and order that Autem' s parent time 
be consistent with the schedule stated in the relocation statute. 
DATED this t;9:l!::day of August, 2015. 
BRINDLEY SULLIVAN, PLLC 
~, 
Brent M. Brindley 
Attorneys for Respondent and Appellant 
8 
_, 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 13-&day of August, 2015, I served a copy of the 
foregoing APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF on each of the following: 
Jared L. Peterson 
MATHIE & PETERSON 
635 North Main, Suite 669 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
(2 copies) 
Utah Court of Appeals 
450 South State Street, 5th Floor 
Post Office Box 140230 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230 
(Original plus 7 copies via Federal 
Express) 
9 
